Arrow's Theorem with a fixed feasible alternative by Weymark, John A. et al.
Soc Choice Welfare (1987) 4:105-115 
Social Choice 
.dWelfare 
© Springer-Verlag 1987 
Arrow's Theorem with a Fixed Feasible Alternative* 
Allan Gibbard 1, Aanund Hylland 2, and John A. Weymark 3 
1 Department of Philosophy, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI 48109, USA 
2 Department of Economics, University of Oslo, P.O. Box 1095, Blindern, N-0317 Oslo, Norway 
3 Department of Economics, University of British Columbia, Vancouver, B.C., Canada V6T 1Y2 
Received June 4, 1986/Accepted in revised form January 15, 1987 
Abstract. Arrow's Theorem, in its social choice function formulation, assumes 
that all nonempty finite subsets of the universal set of alternatives is potentially a 
feasible set. We demonstrate that the axioms in Arrow's Theorem, with weak 
Pareto strengthened to strong Pareto, are consistent if it is assumed that there is 
a prespecified alternative which is in every feasible set. We further show that if 
the collection of feasible sets consists of all subsets of alternatives containing a 
prespecified list of alternatives and if there are at least three additional 
alternatives not on this list, replacing nondictatorship by anonymity results in 
an impossibility theorem. 
1. Introduction 
Arrow's [2] Impossibility Theorem is usually expressed in terms of social welfare 
functions; a social welfare function assigns a social preference ordering to each 
admissible profile of individual orderings of a set of alternatives. The theorem, 
though, can also be expressed in terms of social choice functions. A social choice 
function does the following: for each set of alternatives that might turn out to be 
feasible, and for each admissible preference profile, a social choice function specifies 
a nonempty subset of the feasible set - the choice set. The use of a social choice 
function thus' requires a specification of which subsets of the universal set of 
alternatives are potential feasible sets: In the standard choice-theoretic versions of 
Arrow's Theorem, the collection of feasible sets consists of all nonempty finite 
subsets (or at least all two and three element subsets) of the set of alternatives. Given 
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Institute held at Dalhousie University during the summer of 1984. We wish to record here our thanks to 
the Institute Director, E.F. McClennen, and its sponsors, the Council for Philosophical Studies, the 
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this domain assumption, Arrow's Theorem states that no social choice function 
with an unrestricted preference domain satisfies all of (i) the Arrow [1] choice 
axiom, (ii) independence of (preferences involving) infeasible alternatives, (iii) 
weak Pareto, and (iv) nondictatorship. 
The usual proofs of Arrow's Theorem rely heavily on the assumption that any 
pair of alternatives is a possible feasible set, i. e. any two alternatives might turn out 
to be the only feasible alternatives. Bailey [3] questions the relevence of Arrow's 
domain assumption, and thus question; the relevance of Arrow's Theorem, for 
problems involving the design of economic institutions. In an economic problem, 
feasible sets might be known in advance, say, to take the following form: a feasible 
set consists of all of the allocations attainable given a particular specification of the 
state of technical knowledge and the initial endowment of resources. Such feasible 
sets typically contain an infinite number of alternatives and, thus, do not satisfy 
Arrow's domain assumption mentioned above. In a similar vein, Richelson [14] 
argues that in many political decision-making contexts, not all finite subsets of the 
universal set are potentially feasible. In particular, he notes that in many situations 
there is a status quo alternative which is in every feasible set. 
It may be worthwhile, then, to consider the sensitivity of Arrow's Theorem to 
alternative specifications of the collection of feasible sets. Previous work on this 
topic has been rather limited. Grether and Plott [6] consider what they call k-set 
feasibility. With k-set feasibility, the collection of feasible sets consists of all finite 
subsets of alternatives containing at least k alternatives. They demonstrate that 
Arrow's axioms are inconsistent with this collection of feasible sets ifk is strictly less 
than the total number of alternatives. 1 Donaldson and Weymark [5], motivated by 
economic problems, restrict attention to feasible sets which are compact subsets of a 
Euclidean space and contain an infinite number of alternatives. By placing natural 
economic restrictions on preferences and on feasible sets of alternatives, they 
demonstrate that Arrow's other axioms are consistent with these domain 
assumptions. 
In the present article we explore the implications for social choice theory of 
having every potential feasible set contain a prespecified list of alternatives. This 
restriction on the collection of feasible sets is satisfied, for example, if there is a 
status quo alternative which is always available. 2 Similarly, this restriction is 
satisfied if there is a fixed alternative, not necessarily the status quo, which is 
adopted if no agreement is reached on the choice of another alternative, as in many 
bargaining situations: In many institutional settings, the rules of order require that 
one alternative - the motion - and (often implicitly) the status quo are always under 
consideration. In this example, every potential feasible set contains two fixed 
alternatives? 
We demonstrate that the axioms in Arrow's Theorem, with weak Pareto 
strengthened to strong Pareto, are consistent if the assumption that the feasible set 
domain is unrestricted is replaced by the assumption that there is a prespecified list 
See Grether and Plott [6] for a discussion of  earlier related contributions. Panda [12, 13] extends a 
number  of  social choice theorems from an unrestricted feasible set domain to k-set feasibility. 
2 Richelson [14] provides a number  of  illustrations of this phenomenon.  
3 We are indebted to Bernie Grofman for suggesting this example. 
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of alternatives which are always feasible. We do not have a complete characteri- 
zation of the class of social choice functions which satisfy Arrow's axioms with this 
domain restriction. However, we are able to demonstrate that any member of this 
class of functions must exhibit some dictatorial features if the collection of feasible 
sets consists of all subsets of alternatives containing the prespecified list of 
alternatives and if there are at least three additional alternatives not on this list. 
Furthermore, with this strengthened domain restriction, we find that replacing 
nondictatorship by anonymity results in an impossibility theorem. 
2. Notation, Definitions, and Background Results 
There is a finite set of individuals M= {1 , . . . ,  m} where m > 2 and a universal set of 
alternatives X containing a finite number n _> 3 of elements. Each individual has a 
(weak) ordering, i.e. a reflexive, complete, and transitive binary relation, Ri ~ N of 
Xwhere N is the set of all orderings of X. For  each weak preference relation R ~ N, 
strict preference P and indifference I are defined in the usual fashion. A preference 
profile (Ri) : = ( R 1 , . . . ,  Rrn) E ~m is a vector of individual preference orderings. The 
collection of admissible preference profiles is denoted by N and is called the 
preference domain. The collection of potential feasible sets is denoted by 5 e and is 
called the feasible set domain ; a member of 5 ~ is called a feasible set: 
A social choice function C: 5~ x ~ ( X ) ,  where ~ (X )  is the set of all subsets 
of X, is a mapping which assigns to each admissible feasible set and preference profile 
a nonempty subset of the feasible set called the choice set, i. e: for all S ~ 5 P and all 
(Ri) ~ ~, C(S, (Ri)) c S with C(S, (Ri)) =1= O. A social welfare function F: ~ R is 
a mapping which assigns a social preference ordering of the alternatives to each 
admissible preference profile. A social welfare function Frationalizes a social choice 
function C if for all S t  6 e and all ( R i ) e ~ ,  
C(S, (Ri)) = {x ~ SIxF((Ri))y for all y e S} . 
In other words, the choice set C(S, (Ri)) is the set of most preferred elements in S 
according to the social preference ordering F((Ri)): 
We consider feasible set domains which have a special property: every feasible 
set contains a fixed set Q of alternatives. 
Q-Restricted Feasible Set Domain. For Q c X  with Q~O, S E S P ~ Q ~ S .  
Suppose, for example, as in many contexts, there is a status quo alternative Y 
which is always feasible, then this condition is satisfied with Q = {y}. When Q = {~}, 
we write Y-restricted instead of {:~}-restricted. For  0 4 : Q c Q ' c X ,  if 5 P is a 
Q '-restricted feasible set domain, then 5 a is also a Q-restricted feasible set domain: 
Thus to say that every feasible set contains the set of alternatives Q does not rule out 
the possibility that every feasible set contains some superset Q'  of Q. 
A Q-restricted feasible set domain need not include every subset of Xcontaining 
Q, so it is possible for distinct collections of feasible sets ,9 ° and 5 P' both to be 
Q-restricted feasible set domains. The collection of all subsets of X containing Q is 
called the complete Q-restricted feasible set domain. 
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Complete Q-Restricted Feasible Set Domain. For Q c X with Q =~ 0, S e 5p+--,Q c S. 
The complete Q-restricted feasible set domain is not a Q '-restricted feasible set 
domain for any Q ' ~ X  such that Q c Q '  and Q+Q'. Richelson [14] works with a 
complete Y-restricted feasible set domain. 
We shall have occasion to consider a preference domain which consists of all 
profiles satisfying two properties: (i) everyone prefers the alternatives not in Q to 
the alternatives in Q and (ii) for all admissible profiles, each person has a single 
ranking of the alternatives in Q, where Q is a fixed set of alternatives. We denote the 
restriction of a preference profile (Ri) e ~ "  to Q ~ X by (Ri)Q. 
Q-Minimal Preference Domain. For Q c X with Q =t= 0 and for (Ri)  e N",  
9-= {(Ri) e¢~ m] (i) for all ieM, xPiy for all x e X \ Q  and for all y~Q and (ii) 
<R~>~ = <~>  Q}. 
When Q = {2}, we write X-minimal instead of {:?}-minimal. There is only one 
Y-minimal preference domain as the second defining property of a Q-minimal 
preference domain is trivially satisfied if Q={2}.  If #Q_>2, there are many 
Q-minimal preference domains; each differs in the way individuals rank the 
alternatives in Q. 
The remainder of the conditions we consider in our theorems are standard in the 
literature. 
Unrestricted Feasible Set Domain. Y = ~(X)\O. 
Unrestricted Preference Domain. 9 = ~  ~. 
Arrow's Choice Axiom. For all S, S ' e 5  r, for all ( R i ) e g ,  if S c S '  and if 
C(S', (R~)) m S :# 0, then C(S, (R~)) = C(S', (R~)) m S. ~ 
Independence of Infeasible Alternatives. For all S e 5 P, for all (Ri), (R ' )  e 9,  if 
xR~y+-+xR/y for all i e M  and for all x, yeS ,  then C(S, (Ri))= C(S, (R[)). 
Weak Pareto. For all S e 5 ~, for all ( R i ) e  9 ,  if x, y e S and if xPiy for all i e M, 
then y ¢ C(S, (Ri)). 
Strong Pareto. For all S e 5 e, for all (R~) e 9 ,  if x, y e S and ifxR~ y for all i e M with 
xPzy for some ieM, then y¢C(S, (Rg)). 
Nondictatorship. There does not exist a j~  M such that for all S e 5 °, for all (Ri)  E 9 ,  
C(S, (Ri ) )c  {x~SlxRjy for all yeS} .  
Anonymity. For all SeSZ, for all (Ri), (R[ )  e g ,  if (R ' )  is a permutation of the 
orderings in (Ri) ,  then C(S, (Ri)) = C(S, (R:)). 
4 On an unrestricted feasible set domain, Arrow's choice axiom is equivalent to the weak axiom o f  
revealedpreference, which is defined as : for all x, y e X, for all (R i )  e 9 ,  if there exists an S e 5 ~ such that 
x ~ C(S, (Ri ) )  and y e S \ C ( S ,  (Ri)) ,  then there does not exist an S '  ~ 5 ~ such that y ~ C(S' ,  (R~)) and 
x ~ S ' .  See Arrow [1, Theorem 1] or Suzumura [17, Theorem 2.3]. In general, Arrow's choice axiom is 
weaker than the weak axiom of revealed preference. See Suzumura [17, Theorem 2.1]. 
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In terms of  social  choice funct ions,  A r r o w ' s  [2] Theorem m a y  be s ta ted as 
follows, s 
Arrow's  Theorem. I f  a social choice function has an unrestricted feasible set domain 
and an unrestricted preference domain, then it can not satisfy all o f  (i) Arrow's 
choice axiom, (ii) independence of  infeasible alternatives, (iii) weak Pareto, and 
(iv) non-dictatorship: 
I f  the feasible set d o m a i n  5 ~ has the p rope r ty  tha t  for  all S, S '~ .9° ,  S ~  S ' ~  5 P, 
then 5 ° is closed under (finite) unions. A n  unres t r ic ted feasible set d o m a i n  has this 
p r o p e r t y  as does  any comple te  Q-rest r ic ted feasible set domain .  The role tha t  
A r r o w ' s  choice ax iom plays  in A r r o w ' s  Theo re m m a y  be seen f rom the fol lowing 
p ropos i t i on  due to Hans son  [7]. 6 
Hanssou ' s  Theorem. I f  the feasible set domain 5¢ is closed under finite unions, then 
Arrow's choice axiom is a necessary and sufficient condition for a social choice 
function to be rationalizable by a social welfare function. 
F o r  an unres t r ic ted  feasible set domain ,  the social  welfare funct ion which 
ra t ional izes  a social  choice funct ion  tha t  satisfies A r r o w ' s  choice ax iom is unique,  
and  is de te rmined  f rom the choices made  out  o f  the two-e lement  feasible sets. F o r  a 
comple te  Q-rest r ic ted feasible set domain ,  not  all two-e lement  subsets o f  X can be 
feasible and,  in general ,  more  than  one social welfare funct ion  m a y  ra t ional ize  a 
given social  choice funct ion  which satisfies A r r o w ' s  choice axiom. 
3. Results 
Our  poss ibi l i ty  theorem states tha t  the ax ioms in A r r o w ' s  Theorem,  with weak 
Pare to  s t rengthened  to s t rong Pare to ,  are consis tent  if  the a s sumpt ion  tha t  the 
feasible set d o m a i n  is unres t r ic ted  is replaced by  the a s sumpt ion  tha t  the feasible set 
d o m a i n  is 2 - r e s t r i c t ed ]  
Theorem 1. There exist social choice functions defined on an Y-restricted feasible set 
domain containing a feasible set S with #S>_2 and on an unrestricted preference 
domain which satisfy all o f  (i) Arrow's choice axiom, (ii) independence of  infeasible 
alternatives, (iii) strong Pareto, and (iv) nondictatorship. 8 
s Arrow's Theorem is also valid if the feasible set domain contains all two and three element subsets of 
X. Similarly, our Theorems 2 and 3 below are valid if all sets of alternatives containing Q with cardinality 
# Q + 2 and # Q + 3 are feasible sets. 
6 Our statement of Hansson's Theorem differs in inessential ways from Hansson's original version. 
The main difference arises from the fact that the choice functions Hansson considers do not include 
preference profiles as arguments. See also Suzumura [17, Theorem A(8)]. 
? Note that establishing this theorem for an 2-restricted feasible set domain also establishes the 
theorem for any Q-restricted feasible set domain. 
8 If 5 ° = {2}, everyone is a dictator. 
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Proof The proof is by construction. Assume 5 ~ is an Y-restricted feasible set 
domain. For all x ~ X  and for all { R ~ ) ~ ,  define 
N + (x, (Ri)):  = # {ie MIxPIx} , 
N -  (x, (Ri)) : = # {i e MlYPix} , 
and 
N(x, (Ri)) : = N  + (x, (Ri)) - N -  (x, (R~)) . 
For all S e Y  and for all (R~)e~ ,  define 
C"(S, (R~)): ={xeSlN(x, (Rz))>_N(y, (Ri)) for all yeS}  , 
C'° (S, (Ri)):  = {x e CR(s, (Ri))IN- (x, (Ri)) <_N- (y, (Ri)) 
for all y~  C'g(S, (Ri))} , 
and 
CI(S, (Ri)) : = {x s ~i-1 (S, (Ri))lxRiy for all y ~ ~i-1 (S, (Ri))} , 
i = l , . . . , m  . 
The social choice function is C'~. 
The satisfaction of Arrow's choice axiom is established by showing that ~m is 
rationalized by a social welfare function. For a given preference profile (R~), the 
alternatives in X are first ordered by the numbers N(x,(Ri)). Second, tied 
alternatives are ranked by the number of negative votes received in a pairwise 
comparison with Y. Alternatives which are tied at this stage are then ranked by a 
serial dictatorial ordering. The resulting social preference relationship is a 
lexicographic ordering which rationalizes ~m(., (R~)). Thus, Arrow's choice axiom 
is satisfied by C". 
The information used to determine Cm(S, (Ri)) consists solely of the individual 
rankings of alternatives in S. Hence, if the preference profile changes in such a way 
that the individual rankings in S remain unchanged, the choice set does not change 
either. Consequently, independence of infeasible alternatives is satisfied by ~,m. 
Strong Pareto is established using a proof by contradiction. Suppose x, y e S ~ 5 p 
with xR~y for all i and xP~y for some i but y~Cm(S, (R~)). Since individual 
preference relations are orderings, for this configuration of preferences, we must 
have N(x, (Ri)) =N(y, (Ri)) and N (x, (Ri))=N- (y, (Ri)), so x~ C°(S, (Ri)), 
otherwise y would not be in (7°(S, (Ri)). But having {x ,y}cC°(S ,  (Ri)) is 
inconsistent with having an i e M such that both xPi y and y ~ ~i(s, (Ri)). Thus ~ "  
satisfies strong Pareto. 
Nondictatorship is also established using a proof by contradiction. Suppose 
personj is a dictator. By assumption there exists an S ~ J with at least two elements, 
Y and y. By the unrestricted preference domain assumption, we can consider a 
profile (Ri) with the property that (i) yPj Y and YP~ z for all z ~ X\{Y, y} and (ii) 
xPi Y and yPiz for all zeX\{Y, y} for all i+j. For all z#:x, y, N(z, (Ri)) is negative. 
For y, N(y, (Ri))= 2 -m. Regardless of the profile, N(Y, (Ri))= N-(Y, (Ri))= 0. 
Thus, if m>2 ,  N(Y, (Ri))>N(y, (Ri)) for all y+Y. If m=2 ,  N-(y ,  ( R i ) ) = l .  
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Hence, regardless of the value of m (>  2), C'~ (S, (Ri))  = {2 }, which contradicts the 
assumption tha t j  is a dictator. As j  is arbitrary, this argument establishes that ~m 
is nondictatorial: [] 
The social choice function ~m used to prove Theorem 1 can be thought of as 
operating in a series of steps. First, the social choice function ~R is constructed. If 
not all choice sets are singletons, a tie-breaking rule is introduced yielding the social 
choice function ~o. New tie-breaking rules are then applied sequentially until the 
process is terminated with ~m: 
The social choice function (7 R was introduced by Richelson [14]. N + (x, {Ri)) is 
the number of people who strictly prefer x to 2 in the profile (Ri)  and, similarly, 
N -  (x, {Ri)) is the number of people who strictly prefer 2 to x: If, for a given profile 
(Ri) ,  each individual assigns one point to each alternative preferred to 2, zero 
points to alternatives indifferent to 2, and negative one point to alternatives judged 
to be worse than 2, then N(x, (R~)) is the total number of points received by x. For  a 
given preference profile {Rz) and feasible set S, Richelson's social choice function 
~R chooses the alternatives which receive the highest number of points in S. The 
first tie-breaking rule retains only those alternatives among the ones chosen in the 
first stage which make the fewest number of people worse off compared to 2. 
Finally, a serial dictatorship is used to further narrow the remaining alternatives. 
While ~R by itself satisfies many desirable properties, Richelson demonstrates 
that ~a  does not satisfy weak Pareto if there exists an S~5~ with # S _ > 3 .  9 For 
example, if everyone prefers z to y to 2, then both y and z would be chosen out of 
{~, y, z}, but z Pareto dominates y: It is for this reason that the serial dictatorship is 
introduced as a tie-breaking rule: A simple dictatorship would be sufficient if we 
merely required our social choice function to satisfy weak Pareto; the serial 
dictatorship is adopted to ensure that our function satisfies strong Pareto. 
The second step in our example is not essential when m > 2 or if there exists an 
S ~ ~ with # S > 3. If this step is omitted, person one is a dictator if m = 2 and 
# S < 2 for all S e 5 ~. More generally, this tie-breaking rule limits the scope of the 
nonanonymous part of our social choice function. 
Because of  the use of a serial dictatorship as a tie-breaking rule, the social choice 
function (7 m is obviously unsatisfactory. Given the domain conditions in Theorem 1, 
other social choice functions exist which satisfy the Arrow axioms, but they too have 
dictatorial features. I° For  example, such a social choice function can be constructed 
by first, for any feasible set and admissible profile, restricting attention to 2 together 
with the set of feasible alternatives which Pareto dominate 2 and by then applying a 
serial dictatorship to these alternatives to yield the choice set. In this example, each 
person has the power to veto any alternative which he or she judges to be worse than 
2, but the tie-breaking rule is again dictatorial. If the feasible set domain 5 e is {£, )5} 
- restricted, the preference domain ~ can be partitioned into m subsets with the 
property that if two profiles coincide on {2, 35}, then they are both in the same 
9 Richelson also considers a modified version of ~,R which satisfies weak Pareto. It is easy to verify 
that this modified social choice function violates Arrow's choice axiom. 
lo Formal  details of  the following examples are included in an earlier draft of  this article which 
appeared as Discussion Paper No. 85-15, Department  of  Economics, University of  British Columbia. 
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element of the partition. For  each element of the partition, a different serial 
dictatorship is used to determine the choice sets. By assigning each person to be the 
first "'dictator" for one of the elements of the partition, a social choice function 
constructed according to this procedure spreads the power to make collective 
decisions throughout society. Clearly, such rules are not anonymous. 
All of our examples exhibit some dictatorial features. Theorem 2 demonstrates 
that  this state of affairs is inevitable with a complete Q-restricted feasible set domain 
and a Q-minimal preference domain (or any larger preference domain) provided 
there are at least three alternatives in X not in Q. 
Theorem 2. Ira social choice function has a complete Q-restricted feasible set domain 
and a Q-minimal preference domain and if  # Q + 3 <_ # X, then it can no t satisfy all o f  
(i) Arrow's choice axiom, (ii) independence of  infeasible alternatives, (iii) weak 
Pareto, and (iv) nondictatorship. 
Proof On the contrary, assume such a social choice function exists. By assumption 
T: = X \ Q  contains at least three distinct alternatives. Let (R i ) r ,  9 r ,  N~', S t ,  and 
5P r denote the restrictions of  ( R i ) ,  9 ,  N" ,  S, and 5e, respectively, to the set T. 
Since 9 is a Q-minimal preference domain, 9 r = ~ ' ,  i.e. Nr  is an unrestricted 
preference domain on T. Since 5" is a complete Q-restricted feasible set domain, 
5e r is an unrestricted feasible set domain on T. Define the social choice function 
C* : Yr  x ~ (T) by setting C* (St ,  (Ri )r )  : = C(S, (Ri))  for all S ~ 5 P and for 
all (R~) ~ 9 .  Since C satisfies weak Pareto and 9 is a Q-minimal preference domain, 
C* is a well-defined social choice function on T with an unrestricted feasible set 
domain and an unrestricted preference domain. It is easy to confirm that C* 
satisfies (i) Arrow's choice axiom, (ii) independence of infeasible alternatives, (iii) 
weak Pareto, and (iv) nondictatorship. But satisfaction of these conditions by C* 
violates Arrow's Theorem, a contradiction. [] 
Suppose X contains at least four alternatives and a social choice function C 
satisfies Arrow's choice axiom, independence of infeasible alternatives, and weak 
Pareto with a complete Y-restricted feasible set domain. Let 9 x  denote the unique 
Y-minimal preference domain, i.e. 9~ is the set of profiles in which everyone agrees 
that Y is strictly the worst alternative in X. If 9~ is a strict subset of the actual 
preference domain 9 ,  C need not be dictatorial, as illustrated by Theorem 1. 
However, Theorem 2 implies that C must be dictatorial when restricted to profiles 
in ~ .  For  example, for all ( Ri) ~ 9~, N + (x, ( Ri) ) =m and N -  (x, ( Ri) ) = 0 for all 
x e X \ { Y } .  As a consequence, restricted to @~, person one is a dictator for C". 
More generally, suppose X contains at least three alternatives not in Q and a 
social choice function C satisfies Arrow's choice axiom, independence of infeasible 
alternatives, and weak Pareto with a complete Q-restricted feasible set domain. If 9 
contains two or more Q-minimal preference domains, C must be dictatorial when 
restricted to each Q-minimal preference domain, but the dictator can be made 
conditional on the individual rankings of the alternatives in Q. 
With an unrestricted preference domain and a complete Q-restricted feasible set 
domain, an immediate consequence of Theorem 2 is that an impossibility theorem is 
obtained if the axioms in Theorem I are strengthened by replacing nondictatorship 
with anonymity provided that there are at least three alternatives in X not in Q. 
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Theorem 3. I f  a social choice function has a complete Q-restricted feasible set domain 
and an unrestricted preference domain and if  # Q + 3 < # X, then it can not satisfy all 
of  (i) Arrow's choice axiom, (ii) independence of infeasible alternatives, (iii) weak 
Pareto, and (iv) anonymity. 
4. Independence Conditions on a Restricted Domain 
Hansson's Theorem implies that any social choice function defined on a complete 
Y-restricted feasible set domain which satisfies Arrow's choice axiom can be 
rationalized by a social welfare function. In general, requiring the social choice 
function to also satisfy independence of infeasible alternatives does not imply that 
such a social welfare function satisfies independence of  irrelevant alternatives, which 
constrains the social ranking of any set of alternatives A ~ X to depend only on the 
individual rankings of alternatives in A. A social welfare function satisfies partial 
independence of irrelevant alternatives with respect to Y if the social ranking of any 
set of alternatives A c X depends only on the individual rankings of alternatives in 
A u {Y }.ll In general, a social welfare function rationalizing a social choice function 
need not satisfy this weaker independence condition even if the social choice 
function satisfies both independence of infeasible alternatives and weak Pareto. 
For example, if everyone prefers Y to both y and z, the social ranking of y and z 
is arbitrary. However, with these assumptions, if the preference domain is the 
Y-minimal preference domain Ng, the underlying social welfare function does 
satisfy partial independence of irrelevant alternatives, which on this domain is 
equivalent to independence of irrelevant alternatives. With weak Pareto, 2 is never 
chosen, and the social ranking of y, z E X is uniquely determined from the choice set 
of {Y, y, z}, which is independent of preferences involving infeasible alternatives. 
With a finite number of alternatives there is no loss of generality in assuming 
that the individual preference orderings are representable by utility functions. A 
social welfare functional maps profiles of utility functions on X into ~,  the set of 
o r d e r i n g s  o f  X.  12 In the Arrow problem, individual utilities are ordinalIy measurable 
and interpersonally noncomparable: This assumption concerning the measurability 
and comparability of utilities is formalized by requiring the social welfare functional 
to be invariant with respect to independent monotone increasing transforms of the 
utility functions, i.e. if two profiles of utility functions represent the same profile of 
individual orderings, the functional must map both profiles into the same social 
ordering. In this framework, the independence conditions can be reformulated 
without any implicit assumptions concerning the information content of the utility 
functions. A social welfare functional satisfies independence of irrelevant alternatives 
if the social rankings of any set of alternatives A c X corresponding to two profiles 
of utility functions are identical whenever each alternative x e A is assigned the same 
vector of utility numbers by both profiles. Similarly, partial independence of  
11 To simplify the exposition, we only consider partial independence with respect to 2 rather than with 
respect to some set of alternatives Q. 
12 Surveys of the literature on social welfare functionals may be found in Blackorby, Donaldson, and 
Weymark [4] and Sen [161. 
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irrelevant alternatives with respect to 2 is satisfied if the social rankings of any set of 
alternatives A c X are identical whenever each alternative x e A w {2 } is assigned the 
same vector of utility numbers by both profiles. These conditions are equivalent to 
their counterparts for social welfare functions if the social welfare functional is 
invariant to independent monotone increasing transforms of the utility functions. 
Requiring a social welfare functional to be invariant with respect to independent 
positive affine transforms of the utility functions corresponds to the assumption 
that individual utility functions are cardinally measurable and interpersonally 
noncomparable. Unlike in the ordinal context, with this information assumption, if 
all admissible utility profiles represent preferences in Ng, partial independence of 
irrelevant alternatives is not equivalent to independence of irrelevant alternatives; 
for sets of alternatives A ~ X\{2} the actual utility numbers assigned to 2, not just 
the utility numbers assigned to elements of A, matter in determining the social 
ordering of A. 
For cardinally measurable and interpersonally noncomparable utility func- 
tions, Roberts [15, Theorem 7] establishes that if the domain of a social welfare 
functional consists of all profiles of utility functions which represent preference 
profiles in @x and if the functional satisfies partial independence of irrelevant 
alternatives and a standard weak Pareto condition, then there must exist a 
semipositive vector a such that 
m m 
H [U'(x)  - u ' ( 2 ) ]  ° ' >  H [U ' (y)  - u'(x)l°,--,xPy (,) 
i = 1  i = 1  
for all x, y ~ X\{£} and for all profiles of utility functions ( U 1 , . . . ,  U m) satisfying the 
domain restriction, provided #X_>4. *a It is a simple matter to extend Roberts' 
theorem to the ordinal context: If the social welfare functional must be invariant to 
ordinal, and not just cardinal, transforms of the utility functions, only one of the a~ 
can be positive; i. e. there must be a dictator. This result is a social welfare functional 
analogue to Theorem 2 for Q = {2}. 
Adding anonymity to Roberts' assumptions implies that the a~ in (*) must all be 
equal, and without loss of  generality they can be set equal to one. Thus Roberts has 
obtained an axiomatization of a social welfare functional which rationalizes the 
Nash [10] bargaining solution.14 The rankings of the alternatives obtained using (*) 
with each a~ equal to one are not invariant to ordinal transforms of the utility 
functions: This observation can be used to provide an alternative proof  of our 
Theorem 3 with Q = {2}. 
The conclusions to be drawn from our analysis are essentially negative. While it 
is possible to find social choice functions which satisfy all of  Arrow's conditions 
when the preference domain is unrestricted and the feasible set domain is 
Q-restricted, all such rules must exhibit dictatorial features if the Q-restricted 
feasible set domain is complete. 
13 Strictly speaking, Roberts works with an unrestricted preference domain and shows that (.) must 
apply when the functional is restricted "to preferences in Nx" 
14 See also Kaneko [8], Kaneko and Nakamura [9], and Osborne [11] for related results. 
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